Effects of Structural Characteristics of Explanations on Use of a DSS by Gonul, M. S. et al.
42 (2006) 1481–1493
www.elsevier.com/locate/dssDecision Support SystemsThe effects of structural characteristics of explanations on
use of a DSS
M. Sinan Gönül a, Dilek Önkal a,⁎, Michael Lawrence b
a Faculty of Business Administration, Bilkent University, 06800 Ankara, Turkey
b School of Information Systems, University of New South Wales, Sydney 2052, Australia
Received 7 April 2005; received in revised form 23 September 2005; accepted 6 December 2005
Available online 24 January 2006Abstract
Research in the field of expert systems has shown that providing supporting explanations may influence effective use of system
developed advice. However, despite many studies showing the less than optimal use made of DSS prepared advice, almost no
research has been undertaken to study if the provision of explanations enhances the users' ability to wisely accept DSS advice. This
study outlines an experiment to examine the effects of structural characteristics of explanations provided within a forecasting DSS
context. In particular, the effects of explanation length (short vs. long) and the conveyed confidence level (weak vs. strong
confidence) are examined. Strongly confident and long explanations are found to be more effective in participants' acceptance of
interval forecasts. In addition, explanations with higher information value are more effective than those with low information value
and thus are persuasive tools in the presentation of advice to users.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.Keywords: Explanation; Forecast; Judgment; Adjustment1. Introduction
The last few decades have witnessed a significant
increase in the availability and accessibility of informa-
tion providers that target the decision makers in a variety
of fields ranging from medical to financial sectors
[5,14]. Decision makers routinely seek various forms of
external information assistance to support their decision
making processes with forecasts constituting one of the
most widely used forms of such external assistance.
However, decision makers choose to trust and use these
forecasts only if they believe these predictions are
justifiable, relevant, and valuable in effectively manag-⁎ Corresponding author. Tel.: +90 312 290 1596; fax: +90 312 266
4958.
E-mail address: onkal@bilkent.edu.tr (D. Önkal).
0167-9236/$ - see front matter © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.dss.2005.12.003ing the uncertainties about the future [8]. What makes an
individual use an external forecast, then, is a direct
function of his/her perceptions of its acceptability. A
provided forecast may be considered accurate, justifi-
able and informative from a provider's perspective;
however, its utilization is totally dependent on whether
the user is persuaded that this is the case.
This acceptability issue is a major concern especially
for developers of decision support systems (DSS). What
makes a DSS successful is not simply the accuracy of its
results, but the acceptance of these results by its users.
However, research evidence suggests reluctance by
decision makers to trust the advice provided by a DSS
[2,17,22]. In the field of sales forecasting, despite ready
availability of excellent software, surveys continue to
show that many organisations develop their forecasts
using only management judgement [32], and when
1 A key distinction is that an ES manipulates a knowledge base to
derive managerial advice while a DSS typically manipulates a model
to develop the advice.
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frequently adjusted to produce a lower quality decision
than if no adjustment was made [6]. Davis and
Kotteman [2] in summarising the literature concluded,
“despite the broad effectiveness of decision rules,
decision makers have been notoriously reluctant to use
them” [pg 145]. This reluctance to make use of a DSS
does not seem to stem from lack of familiarity with
computer systems. Davis and Kotteman [2] in an
experiment using a production planning DSS and Lim
and O'Connor [21], using a forecasting DSS showed
that students trained in computer use and playing the
role of subjects, continued to ignore the good advice
given by the DSS even when they could see the DSS
was outperforming their own efforts and when real
money was being paid for performance. It seems clear
then that a key element in DSS design is the need to
focus on effectively communicating to users the quality
of decision support provided.
Provision of an explanation may constitute one of the
most effective methods for improving the acceptance of
forecasts or other decision support advice [19].
However, not all types of explanations may be equally
effective in persuading the user that the advice is
acceptable: the underlying structural characteristics of
explanations could be directly related to their persuasive
effectiveness. The current study focuses on exploring
the effects of structural characteristics of explanations
on the acceptance of DSS advice. In particular, the
effects of explanation length and the effects of the level
of confidence conveyed in the explanation are investi-
gated via an experimental study. The study involves
presenting graphs of time series data along with DSS
provided advice in the form of point and interval
forecasts, accompanied by explanations that differ in
their length and conveyed confidence. The subjects are
asked to make a “final forecast” using the presented
cues. The level of acceptance of the DSS advice is
assumed to be directly related to the difference between
the provided forecast and the subject's final forecast. We
reason that decision makers accept the DSS advice if
they believe it accurate and reliable but will adjust away
from it if they perceive it as unacceptable. Therefore, an
explanation that is more effective and persuasive will
lead to a lower propensity to adjust the provided
forecast, while the situation will be the reverse for a less
acceptable/effective explanation.
This paper concludes that explanations can play a
role in influencing a user's acceptance of the DSS
advice and suggests, for a forecasting application, what
structure of explanations seems most appropriate. Given
the evidence of low acceptance of DSS advice, this is animportant contribution suggesting that explanations may
be a means of improving DSS success.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In the
next section, a brief literature review is provided, along
with the implications for current research. Section 3
details the research methodology used in the experiment
with results of statistical analysis presented in Section 4.
Discussion and limitations are outlined in Section 5. We
conclude by providing implications of the findings and
directions for future research.
2. Literature review and implications for current
research
The development of explanation tools has attracted
attention since the introduction of MYCIN—a medical
expert system incorporating an explanation facility
developed during the 1970s [28]. However this
explanation research has had very little impact within
the DSS field where explanations are almost unknown.
In this section, a brief overview of explanation research
provides answers to questions such as what are the
general types and use of explanations in the wider class
of intelligent systems that may apply to a DSS and why
are explanations provided. The term ‘intelligent system’
is generally applied to the class of systems providing
advice to a decision maker and includes Expert Systems
and DSS (for a complete review of related literature,
please see Refs. [3,10,34]). Almost all the research in
explanations has taken place within the realm of expert
systems, where these explanations serve to communi-
cate the rationale underlying the advice. Expert Systems
(ES) differ from DSS in a number of ways1 (see Ref.
[30] for a full coverage of the differences), although
both are built to assist a decision maker by providing
decision advice.
2.1. Classes of explanations
Within the intelligent system domain, explanations
have been classified along the three dimensions of (i) the
content of explanations, (ii) the provision mechanism of
explanations, and (iii) the presentation format of
explanations [3,10,16,24].
Within dimension (i), the content of explanations,
there are three main categories. The first category can be
called trace or line of reasoning explanations. This kind
of explanation provides a perspective about the internal
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decision support system. It presents insight about the
information that is utilized and the rules, processes or
steps that are used by the system to reach the
recommendation or the outcome it has generated for a
particular case. Thus a trace explanation usually answers
the question “how”. Moreover, they are the simplest to
design, since they can be generated as a by-product in the
system during the generation of outcome; these make
them the most commonly used explanation type [24].
The second category of explanations within dimen-
sion (i) is the justification explanations. These explana-
tions often tap into the deep knowledge that is behind a
generated outcome. They justify the outcome or
recommendation they have given by providing the
theory or causal model through which that outcome was
generated. They provide the rationale behind a decision.
In this respect, they generally answer the question
“why”. Justification type explanations have been found
to be the most effective in increasing the acceptance of
conclusions derived by an ES, when compared to the
other types of explanations [34].
The last category of explanations within the content
dimension is the strategic explanation. These explana-
tions provide an insight about the overall problem-
solving strategy used by the system. They try to form a
global perspective on the operation of the system by
tapping into the planning, strategy and higher level
goals in the system [16]. This kind of explanation is less
commonly used, due to the difficulties in its generation
and presentation.
The second dimension of classification of explana-
tions describes the provision mechanism of explana-
tions; this involves how the users of a system can access
the explanation. Explanations can be user-invoked,
automatic, or intelligent. The user-invoked explanations
are accessed entirely at the request of the user.
Accessing an explanation may involve pressing a key,
writing a command, a hypertext or any other available
mechanism. In contrast, automatic explanations are
provided to the user at all times and, naturally, the user
has no control over this type of provision mechanism.
Finally, the intelligent explanations are often provided to
the users whenever the system judges that there appears
to be a need. These explanations are often complex and
may require complicated AI decisions.
The third dimension, the presentation format of an
explanation refers to how an explanation is provided to
the user. In general, it can be either text-based or in a
multimedia format. The text-based explanation is the
simplest form of presentation. A decision support
system can provide either predetermined sentences(i.e., “canned” text) as explanation or it can combine a
few sentences according to certain integrated rules to
form an explanation. For the latter case, it has been
found that sentences that resemble natural language are
effective in increasing the transparency of a system's
evaluation, leading to better perceptions about the
system [26]. The multimedia type of explanation
involves more than simple text, making use of graphs,
pictures, and animations if applicable. This type of
explanation is harder to develop, and can be expensive.
In return, it may bring more persuasive power to the
system and increase confidence in the output of the
system.
2.2. The role of explanations
An explanation can assist in meeting three possible
goals—(i) to explain a perceived anomaly, (ii) to supply
extra knowledge, and (iii) to facilitate learning from the
system. When people encounter a perceived anomaly in
the advice they are given, they typically demand an
explanation. Providing an explanation may help users
understand the nonconforming advice. It can either
verify that the advice does in fact match the users'
expectations, or it may try to resolve the contradiction
between the users and the system [24]. Another reason
for requesting an explanation may be the users' need for
extra knowledge that will enable them to participate
effectively in a problem-solving task. Individuals often
require additional and prompt information when they are
solving a problem, and an explanation facility may
provide this effectively. It has been found that there is a
positive relationship between explanation use and
performance in a cooperative problem-solving task [9].
For a problem-solving task, the need for information is
generally short term. On the other hand, there may be
long-term learning-related needs. Users of a decision
support system may be able to learn about the DSS and
the problem domain from the information provided to
them and so enhance their effectiveness and efficiency in
future tasks. In this regard, users may request an
explanation to facilitate learning from the system.
Specifically, Mao and Benbasat [24] and Papamichail
and French [26] argue that the cognitive effort perspec-
tive suggests that people will request an explanation as
long as the benefit gained from the explanation out-
weighs the mental effort spent in the absence of it.
2.3. The value of explanations
In examining the implications of explanations for
intelligent systems, Dhaliwal and Benbasat [3] provide a
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based on cognitive learning theory. In a broad sense, it is
suggested that the use of explanations often leads to
learning, which brings increased performance and better
user perceptions of the system, resulting in the
acceptance of the system. Improved understanding and
learning are argued to have two important implications.
The first is the improvement in decision making
performance, in terms of both accuracy and speed.
The second implication is the improvement in the
perceptions of the user toward the system, which is
directly related to intended future use. This improve-
ment involves the improvements in perceptions of ease
of use, of usefulness, of satisfaction, and of trust.
Dhaliwal and Benbasat suggest that these modified
perceptions coupled with the increase in performance
will eventually lead to acceptance of the system.
Another cited effect of explanation use stresses the
increased transparency of the system [16,26]. The
explanations (especially the traces) provide information
about how the system operates and how it generates an
outcome. This increase in visibility facilitates the
participants' acceptance of the system as being logical,
and thus, acceptance of its advice as being justified and
useful.
Research on advice taking identifies three main
reasons for accepting a piece of advice [12]. First,
decision makers wish to improve their judgments
through using the advice provided. The advisors are
generally chosen so that they have more knowledge and
expertise than the decision maker in a particular area of
interest. Therefore, the decision makers assume that the
advice is provided to them by a comparatively more
knowledgeable and experienced person so that using
such advice will improve the accuracy of their own
judgments. Second, the decision makers try to share the
responsibility of a decision with someone else, espe-
cially when the risk associated with an error is high; the
advisors are very suitable for this task. It is psycholog-
ically relaxing for a decision maker to know that they
can always blame their advisors if a decision turns out to
be wrong. The decision maker who uses advice shares
the burden of decision making. The last reason for
taking advice is that the decision makers are generally
reluctant to completely reject the help offered to them.
Previous studies reveal a significant difference
between the use of advice and assessments of its quality
[13]. Although decision makers are not very effective in
using and combining the advice they receive, they can
competently assess the quality of advice received from
different sources, allocating weights to distinguish a
good advisor from a bad one in terms of relevance andaccuracy [11,13]. This is supported in time series
forecasting, where accurate and reliable information
leads to improvements in the quality of judgments and
forecasts [27], even though individuals still tend to
favour their own judgments over other information [22].
After apparently assessing the quality of advice, a
decision maker usually forms a judgment regarding the
reputation of an advisor based on the accuracy of advice
provided over repeated occasions. It is also suggested
that the reputations formed about advisors are directly
related to the level of ‘discounting’ of their advice [33].
Discounting in this context refers to the decision
makers' giving more weight to their self estimates or
opinions than the advisors' recommendations, thus
partially ignoring the advice they have received while
explicitly favoring their own judgment. As expected, a
good reputation will lead to a decrease in the amount of
advice discounting. It is found that advisors' reputations
are formed rapidly in just a few trials and later adjusted
in an asymmetrical way (i.e., it is easier for advisors to
lose a good reputation they have established than to
recover from a bad reputation) [33].
Related to the assessments of advisors' reputation are
the issues of trust, confidence, and expertise. It is found
that cues to expertise, like confidence of an advisor in
his/her recommendations, are important in building
trust, especially when other information about that
person is not available [29]. The same study also points
out that a decision maker's trust in an advisor is directly
linked to the acceptance of the advice that is received
from that advisor. Extending this framework, Wærn and
Ramberg [31] examine the formation of trust when the
provided advice is in the form of an explanation from a
computer or a human advisor. It is found that for easy
tasks, humans are trusted more than computers; for
harder tasks in which the subjects are rarely accurate, the
trust in computers seems to exceed the trust in human
advisors. Investigating the effects of extra information
on decision making, it is found that decision makers are
often eager to use any available information, even if they
are only rumors or predictions that may worsen accuracy
[4]. Accordingly, it may be assumed that when people
are given advice, information or explanation, they will
not be dismissive and will attempt to use all sources at
least partially.
Within the specific DSS domain, using a forecasting
task setting, Lawrence et al. [19] provide the only study
that examines the effects of presenting explanations on
DSS advice acceptance. The authors divided explana-
tions into two types: technical explanations (a “trace”
type explanation—the technique used for making the
forecast and the reasons for its adoption) and managerial
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on what the forecast means given the time series in
question); they report that providing an explanation (in
either format) increased the acceptance of the advice and
had positive effects on decision-maker confidence.
2.4. The current study
Given the practical relevance of justification type
explanations within a DSS framework and the relative
absence of research in this area, the current study
focuses on the relationship between the use made of
advice from a forecasting decision support system and
the characteristics of the explanation accompanying that
advice. We have chosen, for obvious reasons given the
forecasting task setting, to frame the explanations in the
classification categories of justification/automatic/text
using the scheme presented in Section 2.1. In particular,
this study aims to examine the influence of structural
characteristics of justification type explanations on DSS
advice acceptance (as conveyed via adjustments made to
provided advice). From the literature on advice-taking
research, we have chosen to examine the two structural
characteristics of explanation length and level of
confidence conveyed in the explanations. Explanation
length may constitute an important factor for explana-
tion effectiveness. The same thrust of information could
be given in a short, brief and to-the-point format, or it
can be provided in a long and detailed manner. Possible
effects of the length of explanations are not clear.
Longer explanations may be advantageous, since they
can express information clearly and in more detail, with
no short cuts. However, they can be boring, and may
result in incomplete reading. Brief explanations may be
advantageous, since they can be easily absorbed,
although lacking the clarity and comprehensibility of
the longer ones.
We hypothesise that more information in the
explanation enhances its value, hence:
H1. Long explanations are more persuasive than short
explanations.
Regardless of its length, an explanation can bear
either a strong/precise tone, or convey vagueness/
uncertainty. It may be argued that the level of confidence
conveyed in an explanation may also elicit mixed
reactions. Strong and precise language used in an
explanation may convey a higher level of confidence
and may therefore be more likely to persuade a decision
maker to accept the DSS advice. Similarly, an
explanation phrased in vague and uncertain terms may
carry less persuasive power and may invite lessconfidence in the associated forecast; there could then
be a greater likelihood of rejecting the advice and
modifying the forecast. However, an explanation
presented with confident and strong wording carries
also the possibility of backfiring given that forecasting,
due to its nature, involves no certainties. Therefore, the
more strong and precise the style gets, the more
unrealistic it may become to users. Decision makers
receiving a strong and confident explanation may think
that the explanation is “too confident”, unnatural, or that
it is unwarranted.
We hypothesise that confident explanations are more
persuasive, hence:
H2. Strongly confident explanations are more persua-
sive than weakly confident explanations.3. Research methodology
3.1. Subjects
The participants were 116 3rd year business students
at Bilkent University who were taking a business
forecasting course offered in three sections. No
monetary incentives were given, but participation in
the study earned the students extra credit in their final
course grades.
3.2. Design
In a pencil and paper task, participants were
presented with 30 time series plots followed by one-
period ahead point and 95% interval forecasts for each
series. External forecasts were accompanied by expla-
nations. While all the subjects received the same set of
time series (with a different randomized ordering for
each subject) and forecasts, the explanations they
received were manipulated experimentally.
Two independent variables were manipulated regard-
ing the structural characteristics of explanations. The
first independent variable was the length of explanations
with the levels being “short” vs. “long”. The level of
confidence conveyed was the second independent
variable with “strong” vs. “weak” confidence as its
two levels. Thus, a 2×2 factorial design led to four
groups, with the following number of participants in
each group:
1st Group Short explanation, weak confidence (n=29)
2nd Group Long explanation, weak confidence (n=30)
3rd Group Short explanation, strong confidence (n=29)
4th Group Long explanation, strong confidence (n=28)
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nations were developed by summarising the long
explanations and omitting detail judged to be of lesser
importance. Short explanations were between 1 and 1.5
lines long, while the long explanations were between 4
and 5 lines long. Manipulating conveyed confidence
consisted of changing the words used in the explana-
tions. For strong confidence, words such as “definitely,
surely, etc.” were used, while words such as “probably,
possibly, etc.” were utilized to denote weak confidence
(an example of the explanations used in the experiment
is provided in Appendix A).
3.3. Generation of the time series and forecasts
A total of 30 artificially generated time series was
used in the study. These series were presented as real
stock prices, with the names of stocks and time periods
concealed in order to prevent potential biases and
extraneous information effects. The same set of 30
time series was presented to each subject (with a different
randomized sequencing of the series to avoid any
ordering effects).
The series were constructed using three levels of
trend and two levels of variability, producing six groups.
Each group contained five series for a total of 30 series
presented to each participant. Trend levels used were 2%
increasing, 2% decreasing and zero trend. The trend
level of 2% was found by ordinary least squares
regression conducted on the ISE-100 (Istanbul Stock
Exchange) index for the previous year. The noise added
to the trended data was normally generated with zero
mean and two levels of variability. The low variability
series had a standard deviation of 5%, while the high
variability series had a standard deviation of 15%. These
variability levels are realistic for the ISE-100, and have
been used in previous work [25].
External forecasts were constructed via Holt's Linear
Exponential Smoothing technique. Interval forecasts
were estimated using the variance of the exponential
smoothing forecast error and assuming the error
distribution followed a normal distribution. The parti-
cipants were not given any specific information on how
the forecasts were generated.Table 1
Percentage of point and interval forecasts adjusted
Point forecasts
Weak confidence Strong confidence
Short 41.95% (365/870) 42.26% (355/840)
Long 44.71% (389/870) 41.33% (372/900)3.4. Task and procedure
Each subject was presented with a booklet including
the instructions, the forms, and a wrap-up question-
naire. Instructions were discussed and detailed exam-
ples were given in the beginning of the experimental
session.
In particular, subjects were requested to perform the
following task for each of the 30 time series (please see
Appendix B for a sample form given to participants):
They were to (1) examine the provided time series, (2)
study the given point and interval forecasts, (3) carefully
read and think about the provided explanations.
Participants were then asked whether they were satisfied
with the provided point and interval forecasts. If they
were not satisfied (with one or both formats), they were
asked to use their judgment to modify the given point
forecast or interval forecast or both.
All participants were required to do the same task in
the experiment. But in one of the sections of the course
(taken by 47 students), participants were also requested
to complete the additional task of rating the information
value of the provided explanations (i.e., the perceived
usefulness of that specific explanation) using a 7-point
rating scale. The 7-point scale ranged from “very
misleading” to “very helpful” with the mid-scale degree
being “no value”.
4. Findings
The findings are outlined under four categories:
percentage of forecasts adjusted; size of adjustments
made; accuracy of adjusted forecasts; and the perceived
information value of the explanations.
4.1. Percentage of forecasts adjusted
The simplest measure to capture the influence of
explanations involves examining whether a subject has
accepted, without change, the DSS advice (the forecast
suggested by the system). We reason that the more
persuasive the explanation, the more likely it is that the
user will want to accept the advice and not make any
changes. We adopt the complement measure, ‘fraction ofInterval forecasts
Weak confidence Strong confidence
50.69% (441 /870) 57.14% (480 /840)

















Fig. 1. Interaction effect for percentage of interval forecasts adjusted.
Table 3
Mean values for absolute percentage adjustment in point forecasts
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Refs. [19] and [20]. Thus we count, for each subject, the
frequency of adjustments made to the point and interval
forecasts. For the interval forecasts we included any
adjustment made to the interval (i.e., if any modification
was made on any of the bounds, it was counted as a
single adjustment). The percentage of forecasts adjusted
is given in Table 1, along with the count of adjustments
made over the total number of data points in each of the
groups.
For the adjustments made on the point forecasts, no
significant differences are found among the four
groups (F3, 3476=0.79, p=0.501), with no significant
main or interaction effects for explanation length and
the level of confidence conveyed in the explanations.
This suggests that the number of adjustments made on
the point forecasts is not affected by the manipulations
made through the explanations.
However, this is not the case for interval forecasts;
the difference among the groups is in fact significant
(F3, 3476=2.89, p=0.03). Analysis of variance results (as
summarized in Table 2) shows no significant main
effects for the length and style (conveyed confidence)
variables. However, the interaction effect is significant,
as can be observed from Fig. 1.
Manipulating length or style (conveyed confidence)
alone seems not to have a significant influence on the
number of adjustments made to the interval forecasts.
However, long explanations combined with weak
confidence appear to lead to a higher percentage of
forecasts adjusted then short explanations with weak
confidence. Also, short but strongly confident explana-
tions lead to more adjustments than long but strongly
confident explanations. However the effect sizes are
quite low. In summary, the results suggest that neither H1
nor H2 is supported by this study.
It can also be observed fromTable 1 that subjectsmade
adjustments to interval forecasts more than to point
forecasts, regardless of the group (t3479 = 12.97,
pb0.001). This may be due to the fact that there is only a
single point to adjust in the point forecasts,while there are
two bounds that can be adjusted for the interval forecasts.
Inaddition there isevidence thatpeoplepreferasymmetric
bounds for interval forecasts andwould thus tend to adjust
the symmetric intervals provided [18]. Hence, for bothTable 2
ANOVA results for percentage of interval forecasts adjusted
Terms Coefficient (%) F1, 3476 p
Length −0.68 0.65 0.422
Confidence −1.09 1.66 0.197
Length⁎confidence −2.14 6.42 0.011these reasons, interval forecasts may be more likely
candidates for adjustment than point forecasts.
4.2. Size of adjustments made
In addition to examining the percentage of forecasts
adjusted, we can also investigate the size of adjustments
actually made to the forecasts. While the former measure
shows the presence/absence of adjustments, the latter
measure will reveal the magnitude of adjustments thus
providing another view of the influence of the provided
explanation. To capture the size of adjustments made to
the point and interval forecasts, two ratios are utilized:
absolute percentage adjustment in point forecasts
(APAP) and absolute percentage adjustment in interval
width (APAI), where
APAP ¼ jadjusted point forecast−provided point forecastj
provided point forecast
 100 ð1Þ
APAI ¼ jadjusted width−provided widthj
provided width
 100: ð2Þ
If no adjustments are made to the provided forecasts,
these ratios automatically assume the lowest possible
score (0%). The further away the adjusted predictions are
from the provided values, the higher are the APAP and
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ANOVA results for size of adjustments in interval forecasts
Terms Coefficient (%) F1, 3476 p
Length 0.31 0.66 0.417
Confidence 0.77 3.92 0.048
Length⁎confidence −0.83 4.64 0.031
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adjustments made to the point forecasts (measured by
APAP) is not statistically different among the four
groups (F3, 3476=1.07, p=0.362), and neither main
effects nor interaction effects are found to be significant.
It seems that the size of adjustments subjects introduced
to the point forecasts is unaffected by different
explanation manipulations. It is also clear from Table
3 that the size of adjustments made to the point forecasts
is much less than the magnitude of adjustments made to
the interval width, with the difference being statistically
significant (t3479=28.64, pb0.001).
As in the case of percentage of forecasts adjusted,
adjustments are very different for the case of interval
forecasts in comparison to the adjustments for point
forecasts. There exists a significant difference among the
groups for APAI (F3, 3476=3.14, p=0.02) with the least
adjustment made in the long and strongly confident
explanation group. Table 4 shows the significant effects
of conveyed confidence (i.e., style) and the interaction
between explanation length and conveyed confidence.
Fig. 2 displays the size of adjustments made in
interval forecasts and parallels the findings for the
percentage of forecasts adjusted. When a long explana-
tion is accompanied by strong confidence, adjustments
are much smaller than all the other possible combina-
tions. On the other hand, when a long explanation is
communicated in a weakly confident style, individuals











Fig. 2. Interaction effect for size of adjustments made in interval
forecasts.difference due to strong vs. weak confidence when a
given explanation is short. In summary, the results do not
provide support for H1 or H2.4.3. Perceived information value of explanations
As mentioned previously, a subgroup of participants
(i.e., 47 students in a given section of the forecasting
course) was asked to evaluate the information value of
each explanation by using a 7-point scale (with 1=“very
misleading”; 4=“no value”; 7=“very helpful”). Such
ratings of participants' perceptions may provide insights
about their decision to adjust the system provided
forecasts, as well as the size of adjustments they actually
make.
For this analysis, we grouped the data into a 3-point
scale. In the recoded version, the levels became
1=“misleading” (initial ratings of 1 and 2 combined),
2=“no real value” (initial ratings of 3, 4 and 5 combined),
and 3=“helpful” (initial ratings of 6 and 7 combined). The
average information value attributed to the provided
explanations is 2.36 across all groups, which is signifi-
cantly greater than 2 which was associated with “no real
value” (t1401=20.91, pb0.001). Hence, confirming the
participants' verbal comments at the end of the study,
we may conclude that the subjects on average found
the provided explanations helpful to some degree. Table
5 provides the average information value within each
group. Interestingly, explanation length and confidence
appear to have no impact on perceived information
value. However a significant difference between the
groups was found in the perceived information value of
explanations (F3,1398=3.07, p=0.03) due to a signifi-
cant interaction term as depicted in Table 6 and Fig. 3.
This result suggests that the characteristics of length
and confidence have a low manipulation effect on theTable 6
ANOVA results for information value
Terms Coefficient F1, 1398 p
Length 0.023 1.77 0.183
Confidence 0.006 0.12 0.739
Length⁎confidence 0.047 7.44 0.006
Table 7
Differences in adjustment and accuracy measures with respect to information value
Measures Misleading (%) No real value (%) Helpful (%) F2, 1399 p
% of point forecasts adjusted 54.8 41.3 26.9 26.49 b0.001
% of interval forecasts adjusted 63.0 50.8 41.1 13.38 b0.001
APAP 8.0 4.4 3.1 21.80 b0.001
APAI 18.5 13.5 11.7 6.02 0.002
MAPE 26.6 19.8 16.0 8.50 b0.001
Hit rate 71.8 80.4 84.8 6.84 0.001
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influence of these characteristics. The persuasive
influence of an explanation may be based on its
information value, not its characteristics of length and
confidence. We explore this in the following analysis,
where Table 7 presents the fraction of forecasts
changed and the size of the change grouped according
to the perceived information value of the explanations.
Table 7 shows the very strong persuasive influence of
perceived information value. All the adjustment scores
(i.e., percentage of point forecasts adjusted, percentage
of interval forecasts adjusted, APAP, APAI) decrease as
the attributed information value of an explanation
increases. Furthermore we also include in this table
the forecast accuracy2 for point forecasts and the hit
rate3 for interval forecasts as measures of decision
making skill. This shows that the accuracy of the
adjusted forecasts steadily improves as the perceived
information value increases (i.e., MAPE decreases and
hit rate increases at the same time). These findings
confirm the previous results in that if a participant finds
an explanation to be helpful in understanding the
provided forecasts and time series, he/she tends to
trust and accept the provided forecasts. The explanation
is persuasive if it has high perceived information value
and this results in smaller adjustments and higher
accuracy in the adjusted final forecasts. On the other
hand, if an explanation is deemed “misleading”, the
provided forecasts lack credibility, leading to a higher
rate of adjustment and reduced accuracy.
5. Discussion and conclusions
The findings of the current study suggest that
providing an explanation for a given interval forecast
has an influence on the adjustment and therefore on the2 The measure used is mean absolute percentage error (MAPE)
defined as the mean value of the absolute value of the forecast error
divided by the actual value and expressed as a percentage.
3 The hit rate is the percentage of times the actual value falls within
the interval forecast.acceptance of that forecast, a finding not replicated for
point forecasts. However, these results appear to be
contingent on the structural characteristics of explana-
tions. In particular, long explanations expressed in a
strongly confident style seem to be most influential
compared to others, leading to less adjustment. A long and
confident explanation leads forecast users to introduce
judgmental adjustments less often, and the magnitudes of
the adjustments appear to be smaller as well. On the other
hand, if short explanations are required, it seems better to
present them in weakly confident wording. The percep-
tions of usefulness of such explanations (i.e., their
perceived information value) also seem to be higher.
Interestingly, all of the above arguments are sup-
ported only for interval forecasts. The provided
explanations have no statistically significant impact on
point forecasts. A provided explanation for a specific
data set seems to affect the interval forecast adjustment
on that specific data set; and yet, adjustment of the point
forecast for that specific data set appears to be
independent from that explanation. A potential reason
lies in the experimental manipulations conducted; they
perhaps were not particularly suited to produce any
direct effects on point forecasts. Point forecasts are
single-shot numbers meant to contain a variety of
information, both internal and external; it is generally
very difficult to incorporate all the information within a
single number. In this regard, trying to reach an accurate
point forecast becomes a heavy judgmental burden,
especially since the point predictions appear to convey a
false sense of certainty. People may find it difficult to
incorporate the cues of trust or confidence they have
received from the explanations into their point forecasts.
They may have simply adjusted the point forecasts
according to some mental heuristics or shortcuts, making
them less responsive to the manipulations conducted
through the framing of explanations. It is found that a
lower percentage of point forecasts is adjusted relative to
the interval predictions. The size of adjustments made is
also less. In short, it is highly likely that point forecasts












Fig. 3. Interaction effect for information value of explanations.
1490 M.S. Gönül et al. / Decision Support Systems 42 (2006) 1481–1493We found little evidence that the explanation cha-
racteristics of length or confidence exercise a persuasive
influence on acceptance of DSS advice; this may be
because our manipulations of length and confidence did
not achieve the desired impact on the subjects.
However a very significant impact was achieved
through the perceived information value of the
explanations. Those explanations rated as of high
information value were much more persuasive than
those of low value. This suggests that the critical
element in designing explanations is not length or
confidence, but information value.
This study was conducted with business students who
were completing a forecasting course. The use of student
participants is common in judgmental forecasting
research and indeed in the wider field of experimentally
based decision making and experimental economics
research [7,32]. This practice is based on findings
showing students as adequate surrogates for practitioners
in decision making [1] and other business contexts
[15,23]. Future studies with managers will prove
valuable in extending the current work into investigating
the potential effects of varying levels of expertise on the
acceptance of explanations. In addition, current findings
might be confounded by the complexity of the
forecasting task given (i.e., stock price forecasting).
Future work may utilize tasks of varying complexity to
examine the possible interactions and confounding
factors involved in multimedia systems to highlight
comparisons with the text-based, trace type, automati-
cally invoked explanations.
The results of this study have many practical
implications in a variety of fields. The most apparent
impact would be on institutions providing professional
consulting, investment advice, and forecasting. Supply-
ing explanations carries a special significance for the
financial interests of those firms whose success is
mostly dependent on their ability to convince theircustomers/users of the value of the information support
they are providing. If the users are not satisfied with the
presented advice/forecasts, they may switch to compet-
ing information providers.
In conclusion, our findings have immediate repercus-
sions for the explanation facilities incorporated into
decision support systems. Although there has been
extensive research on designing these facilities, consid-
erably less attention has been given to the structural
characteristics of the explanations generated by these
facilities. The results of the current work suggest
directions for promising future work in this area.
Appendix A. Sample explanations
A.1. Short explanation, strong confidence
New government subsidy is certainly responsible for
the upward trend starting from week 20. We strongly
believe that this is excessive and there will be a drop.
A.2. Short explanation, weak confidence
New government subsidy may have led to the
upward trend starting from week 20. This seems to be
excessive and there may be a drop.
A.3. Long explanation, strong confidence
The government has decided to provide a new
subsidy for some of the company's products. This was
announced in week 20, and it immediately caused the
upward trend in the stock prices starting from that
week. This upward trend can be distinctly observed
from the time series data. However, we find this
increase to be very excessive. We, therefore, strongly
believe that there will be a drop in the stock prices in
the 26th week.
1491M.S. Gönül et al. / Decision Support Systems 42 (2006) 1481–1493A.4. Long explanation, weak confidence
The government has decided to provide a new
subsidy for some of the company's products. This was
announced in week 20, and it may have led to theupward trend in the stock prices starting from that
week. This upward trend may be observed from the
time series data. However, this increase may appear to
be excessive so that there may be a drop in the stock























Our forecast for week 26: 
Point forecast : 3630
95% interval forecast: [2530 – 4730]
Our explanation : 
New government subsidy is certainly responsible for the upward trend starting from week
20.We strongly believe that this is excessive and there will be a drop. 
Would you like to modify the given point forecast?   Yes  No
If yes,
Your point forecast:   
Would you like to modify the given interval forecast? Yes  No
If yes,
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